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Abstract 
Deindustrialisation is the phenomenon of the secondary sector growing more slowly than the rest of the economy, 
whether measured by share of GDP or of employment. Almost all rich OECD countries have been experienc-
ing it. However New Zealand has been deindustrialising faster than the OECD average (even if the energy 
based industries developed in the 1980 S are included). The paper describes the phenomenon, and discusses 
why it has happened. 1 
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New Zealand is not usually thought of as ~industrial so-
ciety. In the nineteenth century it did not have the dark sa-
tanic mills of Europe from whence fled the Pakehas' an-
cestors. Today its factories are usually smaller than those 
of most industrial societies,- and their products do not have 
the prestige that symbolizes modern industry. The interna-
tional and national vision of New Zealand is a rural coun-
try, whose economy specializes in rural products. 
Certainly by international standards New Zealand's mod-
ern farming sector is exceptionally important. Yet for most 
of the post-war era the size of New Zealand's industrial 
sector has been comparable to that of other OECD coun-
tries, with a manufacturing sector larger than th~ agricul-
ture sector by contribution to GDP since the 1950's, and by 
employment since the 1940's. In the early part of the post-
war era the majority of the manufacturing sector created 
jobs and saved foreign exchange, thus contributing to goods 
and services to material welfare and to the full employ-
ment of psychological welfare. Much was produced be-
hind high levels ofborder(and internal) protection, although 
economists disputed the extent that this protection was ben-
eficial or detrimental to overall economic welfare. A smaller 
part of manufacturing was directed at adding value to the 
key foreign exchange earning pastoral exports. 
From 1966, following a fall in the terms of trade which 
made pastoral exporting less attractive, the manufacturing 
exporting sector developed from its processing oftenns of 
the traditional exports, to adding value to new primary prod-
ucts of forestry, fishing, mining, and non-pastoral farm prod-
ucts, together with some general manufacturing mainly to 
Australia but to other nearby countries in Asia and the Pa-
cific. Manufacturing experienced another major change in 
the early 1980's, when the energy surpluses from the Maui 
gas field and the Waitaki basin hydro-scheme created "think 
big'' energy intensive production, which were typically 
substitutes for imports. 
But from the 1970's, border and internal protection had 
been systematically lowered (very quickly after 1984), so 
that today there is very little general manufacturing com-
peting against imports. It either exports - value added to 
primary processing, manufactured commodities, or elabo-
rately transformed manufactures - or provides products 
which cannot be practically imported. Nevertheless, until 
the mid 1980's the relative size of the sector remained 
roughly constant at a 21 to 24 percent contribution to GDP, 
and a 23 to 27 percent share of the labour force. Thereafter, 
both shares began falling. The employment share is now 
about 15 percent, and the GDP contribution share is under 
19 percent. This is "deindustrialization". 
This paper details the change, sets down the major reasons 
for it, examines the macro-economic implications which 
suggest the decline should be arrested, and suggests poli-
cies to do this. While some deindustrialization is inevita-
ble, we shall see that its rapidity is a threat to the viability 
of the New Zealand economy. 
The pattern of deindustrialization 
This study uses two measures of the relative size of manu-
facturing and other sectors. The frrst is the contribution the 
sector makes to GDP. The second is the share of the sec-
tor's employment in national employment (the labour force 
less the unemployed). Statistical measurement always in-
volves complicated issues. In particular these indicators are 
for long periods, so they are especially prone to conceptual 
and statistical drift. But the trends are likely to be broadly 
correct. 
Manufacturing S contribution to GDP share 
As Table 1 shows, between the end of the First World War 
and the mid 1980's, the Manufacturing Sector's contrib-
uted between 21 to 24percent to GDP, averaging 22.4 per-
cent between 1954/5 and 1983/84. But from the mid 1980's, 
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Table 1. Contribution to Production Perceril ofGDP 
1919/20 1929/30 1938/39 1952/53 1959/60 1964/65 t969no 1974n5 1979/80 1983/84 1989/90 1994/95 
Agriculture 29.8 26.2 23.2 22.1 18.0 14.2 11.7 7.7 10.1 7.3 7.0 6.2 
Other Primary 2.9 3.9 4.3 3.7 4.3 3.0 5. 1 5.5 6.8 . 6.0 
Manufacturing 2 1.6 23.7 2 1.7 21.1 21.8 22.5 22.5 23.3 23.3 22.3 18.8 18.9 
Construction 4.0 6.6 8.0 7.1 7.2 6.3 5.7 7.4 4.6 5.1 4.7 5.2 
Domestic Trade 15.2 16.4 18.7 21.9 20.7 21.9 20.0 20.6 14.9 16.5 
Transport & Corn 5.8 8.5 7.4 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.9 8.5 8.7 8.7 
Finance 7.7 7.3 8.2 8.6 9.1 9.9 9.6 11.1 15.4 15. 1 
f Other Services 15.5 13.6 14.4 15.4 18.0 19.2 19.4 19.5 23.7 23.4 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
.[ Source: Easton In Stormy Seas, p.l40, updated with SNZdata. 
~ § 
Note : TI1e defi nitions are aligned, as far as possible to the Philpott & Nana definitions of 1959/60 to 1983/84. 
i Table2. Share of Employment ~ 
;!. 
s· 1936 1945 195 1 1956 1961 1966 197 1 1976 198 1 1986 1991 1996 
;:: 
Agriculture and hunting 24.7 19.0 17.7 15.6 13.8 12.5 10.8 9.5 10.1 10.8 9.5 9.8 • ~ Forestry & fishing 1.9 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 Mining & quarrying 1.9 1.2 1. 1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 il. Manufacturing 17.1 20.5 24. 1 23.8 25.0 26.8 25.4 24.7 24.2 21.0 16.8 15.2 
* 
Electricity, gas & water 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1. 3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 
Building & construction 7.5 6.7 8.5 10.0 9.7 9.3 8.5 9.1 6.7 6.8 6.2 6. 1 
Wholesale, retail, restaurant 13.5 11.9 14.2 15.3 15.7 14.8 17.9 17.5 17.0 19.4 20.7 23.8 
Finance, insurance, property 5. 1 5.7 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.9 5.9 6.4 7. 1 7.4 I 1.8 14.0 
Transport, storage, comm 10.1 11.0 10.6 10.3 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.0 8.4 8.2 6.2 5.7 
Government 2.6 9.4 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.8 6.0 5.2 6. 1 4.4 
Personal & Private Services 9.2 5. 1 6.0 5.4 5.2 4.5 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.3 4.0 
Other Services 5.5 7.3 7. 1 7.9 8.8 10.1 12.4 13.8 15.1 15.9 18.4 16.1 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT tOO 100 100 tOO tOO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Population Censuses. 
Note: Definil ions change s lightly between some Censuses. 
"' 
"' 
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Table 3. Manufacturing share of value added 
1974 % 1993 % 
Luxembourg 41.8 Korea 27.0 
Germany 36.0 Japan 25.5 
Portugal 33.8 Germany 24.9 
Japan 33.6 Czech Republic 24.4 
Austria 30.8 Portugal 23.9 
Belgium 30.8 Finland 21.1 
Italy 28.6 Turkey 20.8 
France 27.9 Austria 20.5 
Spain 27.7 OECD 20.4 
Sweden 27.2 Spain 20.3 
United Kingdom 27.1 Italy 20.0 
Finland 26.3 France 19.5 
Korea 25.7 Luxembourg 19.5 
Netherlands 25.0 Belgium 18.4 
New Zealand 24.1 United Kingdom 18.1 
Mexico 24.0 New Zealand 18.1 
United States 23.3 Sweden 18.0 
OECD 22.9 United States 17.8 
Ireland 22.8 Netherlands 17.8 
Norway 21.9 Mexico 17.5 
Australia 21.3 Denmark 16.5 
Canada 19.7 Australia 14.5 
Turkey 18.3 Greece 13.2 
Greece 18.2 Iceland 12.8 
Denmark 18.1 Norway 11.5 
Iceland 13.0 Canada 
Czech Republic Hungary 
Hungary Ireland 
Poland Poland 
Switzerland Switzerland 
Source: OECD 
that share deteriorated to 18.8 percent in 1989/90 and 19.4 
percent in 1994/95. This apparent stability in the 1990's 
does not represent a structural change so much as a cycli-
cal recovery in commodity prices for base metals and for-
estry products. Preliminary figures indicate that the struc-
tural decline has continued since. 
The decline represents about 3.5 percentage points ofGDP. 
That does not simply convert into a 3.5 percentage fall in 
GDP. Because manufacturing purchases inputs and gener-
ates flow-on economic activity the impact on GDP is greater. 
There is good reason to expect the share will continue to 
fall. Two major factors are the closure of the car assembly 
and associated component industry as a result of the 1998 
tariff elimination, while further plant closures are threat-
ened as a result, of the proposed tariff reductions after 2001. 
Manufacturing's contribution to employment 
As Table 2 shows, manufacturing's share in employment 
exceeded 24 percent of the total for much of the postwar 
era, although perhaps the share was declining at around I 
percentage point a decade from the mid 1960s. That the 
average employment share from 1954/55 to 1983/84 was 
about two percentage points higher than the manufactur-
ing's share in GDP indicates that labour productivity in 
manufacturing was a little lower than the economy wide 
average. This was because manufacturing has not been as 
capital intensive as agriculture, mining, energy, communi-
cations, and housing. That the employment share had been 
falling slowly while the output share had been broadly con-
stant reflects the labour productivity rising faster in this 
sector than on average. 
From the mid 1980's, the employment share begins falling 
quickly- to 16.8 percent in 1991 and 15.2 percent in 1996. 
If the employment share had followed the gently falling 
trend line of the pre 1986 era, it would have been closer to 
22 percent, some 7 percentage points higher. Today, manu-
facturing has the lowest proportion of total employment 
since the 1860's when gold prospecting drained off other 
domestic production. In recent years, the employment share 
fall has been faster than the added value fall, so manufac-
turing labour productivity has risen sharply and is now 
above the economy wide average. 
The international evidence 
That the New Zealand economy has been rapid ly 
deindustrializing since the mid 1980's parallels an intema-
Table 4. Manufacturing share of profit 
1960-1973 % 1990-1995 % 
Switzerland 37.7 Czech Republic 31.3 
United Kingdom 36.8 Germany 29.2 
Germany 35.8 Austria 25.3 
Luxembourg 33.5 Korea 25.1 
Austria 31.9 Portugal 24.0 
Belgium 31.5 United Kingdom 23.8 
Sweden 30.1 Japan 23.7 
Netherlands 28.4 Finland 23.7 
Australia 28.0 Denmark 22.5 
France 27.6 Italy 22.4 
Finland 27.5 Switzerland 21.8 
New Zealand 27.2 Spain 20.8 
OECD 27.0 Belgium 19.9 
Italy 26.8 Ireland 19.7 
United States 26.4 OECD 19.5 
Norway 25.9 Sweden 19.2 
Spain 25.8 France 19.1 
Japan 25.1 Greece 17.3 
Canada 24.1 Iceland 17.3 
Denmark 23.6 Netherlands 17.3 
Portugal 23.6 New Zealand 17.0 
Iceland 23.3 United States 16.9 
Ireland 19.1 Norway 15.1 
Greece 14.5 Canada 15.0 
Turkey 9.2 Turkey 14.6 
Czech Republic Australia 14.1 
Hungary Hungary 
Korea Luxembourg 
Mexico Mexico 
Poland Poland 
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Figure 1. Manufacturing share of added value 
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tional phenomenon. Table 3 shows that New Zealand ranked 
15th outof25 in contribution to GDPterms in 1974, with a 
share of 24.1 percent. This was a little above the OECD 
average share of22.9 percent. By 1993 New Zealand was 
still 15th, but its share of 18.1 percent was below theOECD 
average of 20.4 percent. The evidence of the table is that 
most OECD countries experienced deindustrialization (Ko-
rea is the marked exception), but on the contribution to 
GDP measure New Zealand was deindustrializing faster 
(Figure 1). 
Table 4 shows that New Zealand ranked 12th in employ-
ment terms in the 1960-1973 period, with 27.2 percent, just 
above the OECD average of 27.0 percent. By the 1990 to 
1993 
1995 period New Zealand was 20th at 17.0 percent, well 
below the OECD average of 19.5 percent. On this measure 
the OECD also experienced deindustrialization, but again 
New Zealand's was one of the most drastic (Figure 2). 
A complication in interpreting the comparative data arises 
from the development of the energy intensive development 
which took place in the early 1980's. In 1974n5 the chemi-
cal subsector contributed 2.0 percent to GDP, but in 1994/ 
5 it was 2.6 percent. If it had grown as slowly as the rest of 
manufacturing, the manufacturing sector would have been 
over one percentage point of GDP smaller, and New Zea-
land manufacturing would have been more like 20th on the 
contributor to GDP in the mid 1990's OECD league table. 
Figure 2. Manufacturing share of employment 
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Thus 'Think Big'' obscures the high rate of deindustrialization 
of the New Zealand economy. 
Why the deindustrialization? 
Any explanation of why the New Zealand manufacturing 
sector has been getting relatively smaller needs to address 
two issues. Why does the phenomenon occur elsewhere in 
the world too (this section), and why New Zealand's is ex-
periencing a greater one than most (next section). 
There is a well elaborated theory of the structural change 
which most economies experience as they develop. Initially 
the primary sector share of economic activity contracts as 
workers shift to more productive and higher paid (often 
urban) sectors, and as relative demand for primary prod-
ucts, especially food, diminishes. 
These mechanisms do not quite apply to New Zealand -
generally New Zealand agriculture is (and has been) a very 
productive part of the economy, while as a major food ex-
porter New Zealand farming is not as pressed by the di-
minishing share of foodstuffs in local final consumption. 
Nevertheless since before the war the share of fanning in 
economic activity has been diminishing (Tables 1. 2). The 
deceleration of the decline of the whole of the primary sec-
tor has not been as great, because forestry and deep sea 
fishing has expanded, and new hydroelectricity and hydro-
carbon energy sources were exploited. The service sector 
absorbs the resources released from the primary sector as 
the share of services rises in final consumption, and be-
cause the primary and secondary sectors outsource work to 
the service sector (as when a farmer hires an accountant). 
Meanwhile the manufacturing sector retains its share of 
economic activity. 
There are exceptions to the general pattern. A resource 
boom, as occurred in Australia and Norway, will increase 
the size of the primary sector, and squeeze the manufactur-
ing sector, because it is difficult to import services which 
tend to be produced at the point of sale. This distinction 
between that which can be transported between point of 
production and of sale/consumption, and that which has to 
be produced at the point of sale/consumption is a key in 
the separation of the economy into a tradeable and non-
tradeable sector, which becomes central in the Section 3. 
There are manufacturing products where transport costs 
have been so high that they are located close to their con-
sumers. The plethora of local breweries half a century ago 
illustrates this, but their demise also illustrates that trans-
port and communication costs have dramatically lowered 
in recent years - a key element in the story. It is also true 
that some services are tradeables, most obviously the tour-
ist industry. 
These changes are sometimes summarized as "economic 
globalisation", which involves production shifting to loca-
tions of minimum cost This has especially involved low 
cost, labour intensive manufacturing production moving 
to East Asia, with the result that the manufacturing sector 
share of economic activity declines in the local economy 
and rises in East Asia (as was reported in regard to South 
Korea). There may also be an element that manufacturing's 
share in final consumption is declining as increasingly af-
fluent consumers increase their demand for services. 
So in recent years manufacturing's share in OECD eco-
nomic activity has been decline. (The share of manufactur-
ing in nominal OECD GDP fell from 28.6 percent in 1960-
1973 to 20.4 percent in 1990-95. The figures for employ-
ment share are 27.0 percent and 19.5 percentrespectively.} 
This deindustrialization seems to be a long term structural 
change. It is unlikely that New Zealand can resist the trend, 
any more than it was able to resist the long term trend of 
the agricultural's falling share of economic activity. But 
that does not explain New Zealand's greater 
deindustrialization. 
The faster deindustrialization of New 
Zealand 
Following are three closely related explanations for New 
Zealand's faster deindustrialization. 
The weakness of microeconomic industrial policy 
As will become clear in the next section, the tradeable sec-
tor has a special role in the growth process of a small open 
economy, because it earns (or conserves) the foreign ex-
change needed to pay for imports. Current economic policy 
does not recognize this role. It professes to treat all sectors 
equally although, in practice, policy is pro-finance at the 
expense of production. Moreover this claimed neutrality 
towards the various production sectors ignores their fun-
damental differences. Phenomena such as industry exter-
nalities and the need for long term investment, and needs 
such as infrastructure are ignored in favour of an idealised 
impractical theory which most closely mirrors the situa-
tion of the finance sector, and as a result benefits that sector. 
This ideologically driven vision has meant that the govern-
ment has no industry policy. Instead it has stripped away 
industry support, without any clear understanding of its role 
or the positive benefits that the economy obtains from it. A 
good example has been the withdrawal of border protec-
tion at a rate faster than the industry could adjust, without 
there being any alternative employment. Coupled with the 
unfavourable macroeconomic environment from an over-
valued exchange rate and high interest rates the manufac-
turing sector in particular, and the tradeable sector in gen-
eral, has suffered. 
To simplify, a manufacturing sector makes STMs (simply 
transfonned manufactures) and EfMs (elaborately trans-
formed manufactures). Strictly the critical difference is the 
processes involved and any manufacture may be a mix of 
STP(rocesse)s and ETP(rocesse)s. Typically the level of 
the last process usually defines whether the final good is 
an STM or an ETM. The distinction is mainly about the 
sophistication of the work skills and quality standards in-
volved in the production process. Given access to the raw 
materials or the components, STPs can be manufactured 
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Figure 3. Export volumes 
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offshore by low skilled workers. In effect a New Zealand 
STP involves competing against low paid Asian and other 
workers. Ultimately there is little future in New Zealand 
industry attempting an industrialisation strategy based on 
STPs. While some workers' wages in STP industries may 
be subsidized one way or another by the state via border 
protection, fiscal subsidies, or some other intervention, the 
entire workforce cannot be so subsidized. In any case low 
wage work (or a high cost goods to consumer, which is 
often the consequence of the interventions) has the inevita-
ble consequence of the workers migrating to a high wage 
economy such as Australia. 
An indication of how unsatisfactory the New Zealand ETM 
performance is appears in some New Zealand Manufactur-
ers Federation estimates. They found that in the December 
1995 year, only 16.8 percent of al1 exports of goods were 
ETMs, just over half of which went to Australia. However 
Australia exported over a $1b more E1Ms to New Zea-
land, than New Zealand did to Australia. The structure of 
New Zealand exporting remains predominately primary 
products and commodities (albeit more diversified in type, 
destination, and added value than 30 years ago). Moreover 
unlike most other OECD economies, the share ofE1Ms in 
New Zealand's exports has not grown since 1985. Com-
modity manufactures (STMs) expanded in the 1980's with 
the commissioning of the energy intensive plants, and so 
over the decade they grew faster than ETMs by about 4 
percent p.a. 
'This partly reflects natural advantage, but it also leaves New 
Zealand as a commodity exporter vulnerable to the vagar-
ies of international trade policy, and to international shocks, 
especially sudden deteriorations in the terms of trade. The 
ETM failure is a major reason why New Zealand's 
deindustrialization has been stronger than that of the OECD 
average. 
The macroeconomic repression of the tradeable sector 
In this subsection, we shall look at the tradeable sector of 
which the manufacturing sector is an important part, and 
only of goods for there is no suitable data on services. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 graph the volume of (i.e. constant price or 
real) exports and imports since 1976. They suggest that up 
to 1985 New Zealand exports grew faster than the OECD, 
and up to 1986 (or 1988)NewZealand imports grew slower. 
Allowing for the import substitution effect of the energy 
intensive industries that came on stream in the mid 1980's, 
the import turning point is probably 1985 too. After 1985 
New Zealand exports grew slower and imports grew faster 
than the OECD average. By no means coincidentally, New 
Zealand GDP grew slightly faster than the OECD in the 
pre 1985 period, and slower in the post 1985 period. 
Not only was there an increasingly antagonistic industrial 
policy, there was also a hostile macro-economic environ-
ment. While the removal of export incentives and tariffs 
requires a fall in the real exchange rate to maintain export 
sector profitability, the real exchange rate rose sharply. This 
not only transferred the benefits of the higher terms of trade 
to the domestic sector, but was the central element of the 
disinflation of the economy, as the New Zealand inflation 
rate shifted from among the highest in the OECD, to one of 
the lowest. 
The consequences on the tradeable sector was that its prof-
itability was undennined, while importing became more 
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attractive. ~xport volume growth slowed down and import 
volume growth accelerated. The high import volume growth 
in comparison to the OECD average is all the more aston-
ishing given the lower GDP growth of the New Zealand 
economy. New Zealand's import penetration was rising 
even faster. The slower growth of the tradeable sector in-
evitably translated into slower economic growth. 
At the crucial time when macroeconomic policy was pres-
suring the tradeable sector its productivity growth perform-
ance deteriorated. Productivity growth in the exportable 
sector slowed down in the late 1980's. (Importable sector 
productivity growth is cyclical but an underlying secular 
slowdown from the early 1990's is also evident.) This was 
partly the failure of a supportive industrial policy, like that 
in the 1970's and early 1980's which had encouraged ex-
pansion, diversification, and productivity growth, com-
pounding the poor macroeconomic environment. Export-
ing is not an activity which can be conveniently turned on 
and off like a tap, or a financial transaction. It is not just 
that domestic production requires investment and process 
development. The action of exporting of sophisticated prod-
ucts requires market development in the locality including 
the building of a distribution network, and market identifi-
cation and reputation. It is hard to quantify the deteriora-
tion, but anecdotally it is reported that much export devel-
opment fell off from the mid 1980's, as exporters were profit 
squeezed and facing high borrowing rates. 
This market development point applies less to commodity 
exporting, which typically involves a less sophisticated 
product, with a simple specification, usually going to a 
manufacturer as a product input. In any case, an overval-
Figure 4. Import volumes 
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ued exchange rate discourages domestic value adding, and 
so the primary product is more likely to be exported as a 
commodity, with a minimum of processing. Thus the New 
Zealand economy remained trapped into a colonial export 
mode, of producing the materials that the metropolitan coun-
try would convert into sophisticated products. Commodity 
exports remain more vulnerable to fluctuations in market 
conditions and prices. 
The increasing dominance of the finance and 
business services sector 
Table 1 and 2 showed that the finance, insurance, real es-
tate, and business services sector increased its share of ac-
tivity from the mid 1980s. The contribution to GDP share 
grew slower than the employment share underlying the poor 
labour productivity performance of the sector over the pe-
riod. In 1996 the finance sector employment share was 14.0 
percent compared to 15.2 percent for manufacturing. While 
the tradeable sector on which the nation's economic pros-
perity has been in decline, the financial sector has expanded. 
Between the 1986 and the 1996 Census the numbers em-
ployed in the Finance, Insurance and Property sector in-
creased 104,000, (or by 83.9 percent) over the decade, while 
those in the rest of the economy grew only 27,000 (2.0 per 
cent). (The top three tradeable sectors lost 76,000 jobs, or 
15.6 percent). If current trends continue the finance and 
business services sector wil1 soon be employing more than 
the manufacturing sector in the near future. 
Now the finance and business services sector has a crucial 
role in a well functioning economy. As its name says, that 
function is mainly to service the rest of the economy. In 
600 
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Source: OECD (Note: OECD countries differ before 1981) 
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1981 each worker in the sector was servicing 13.5 other 
workers. By 1996 each sector worker was servicing 6.2 
workers. 
One factor has been outsourcing of finance and business 
services (which once took place within the productive finn 
(or fann) or in the public sector. In addition some con-
sumer financial activities have increased. But government 
policy has been supportive of financiers in contrast to its 
antagonism to the tradeable sector. 
Not only has the finance sector filled deindustrialization's 
value added and employment gap, but it also fills the for-
eign exchange gap. Because the tradeable sector is no longer 
earning and conserving sufficient foreign exchange, for-
eign exchange receipts are supplemented by borrowing, via 
the finance sector. Unlike earning the funds by tradeable 
production, the borrowing strategy of the financial sector 
is not sustainable. 
The ongoing balance of payments crisis 
Traditionally the management of the New Zealand economy 
has included the Balance of Payments rule that· the annual 
current account defici t (a.k.a external deficit) should aver-
age about 3 percent of GDP, with a comfort zone of I to 5 
percent. A rise (or expectation of rise) of the deficit above 
5 percent triggered a macroeconomic policy response, usu-
ally aimed to reduce imports by a reduction in aggregate 
demand or by increased import controls. In that traditional 
economy, the government was the main borrower for the 
overseas funds to cover the deficit, so the comfort zone 
represented an assessment of what could be reasonably be 
borrowed in any year before lenders became uneasy. The 
underlying theory pointed out that if the net foreign cur-
rent payments deficit percentage exceeded the nominal GDP 
growth rate, the Net Foreign Debt to GDP ratio would rise. 
At the time of presentation of the paper the external deficit 
was about 7 percent of GDP, perhaps moving slowly back 
to just above 6 percent ofGDP, according to the more opti-
mistic forecasters. This is outside the traditional comfort 
zone, so we may expect foreign lenders to get increasingly 
anxious. 
We can explore how the producti ve economy might respond 
given the task of halving a external deficit, by simulating a 
simple model of an economy which looks a bit like the 
New Zealand economy in 1998, with an external deficit of 
8 percent of GDP. I identify four strategies, each of which 
aimed to get the deficit down to 3 percent of GDP. Here is 
a summary of the findings. 
Reducing aggregate domestic demand 
Suppose aggregate demand in the economy was reduced 
(with no extra exporting). Aggregate domestic demand had 
to decrease 9.5 percent and production 7 percent to get the 
required (8.5 percent) reduction in imports. The parameters 
and assumptions can be varied, but the basic conclusion 
remains. Obtaining the 3 percent target external deficit by 
reducing imports from cutting aggregate demand, requires 
very large cuts which would almost certainly generate 
record post-war unemployment: 
Increasing exports 
Suppose exports were to increase, generating some extra 
economic activity, which increases imports . Thus the ex-
port increase would have to be more than 3 percentage 
points of GDP. The model has exports increasing 11.3 per-
cent, production by 4.5 percent, imports by 1.1 percent, 
and domestic expenditure by 1.4 percent to get down to the 
3 percent of GDP external deficit target. This may not be 
very feasible (see below). At this point it should be noted, 
the strategy vitally depends upon a very tight fiscal stance, 
with additional tax revenue (and savings) not being spent. 
Import replacement 
Suppose import replacement increased but there was no 
change in exports. The extra production in the economy 
would draw in more imports, so spending would go up, as 
well as production. In summary the simple model predicts 
a 5.3 percent increase in production, a 2.1 percent increase 
in expenditure, and a reduction in the propensity to import 
of 12.9 percent. Again it requires a very tight fiscal stance. 
Growth 
Thus far it has been assumed that the changes are instanta-
neous. The fourth scenario, using a different model from 
the previous three, assumes that GDP grows at 3 percent 
p.a., the average propensity to import remains constant, and 
exports grow at 4.5 percent p.a., considerably higher than 
the current forecast of 3 percent p.a. In this projection it 
takes eight years before the economy reaches the 3 percent 
of GDP external deficit, although it enters the comfort zone 
of less than 5 percent of GDP after three years. Note again 
the fiscal stance has to remain tight. 
The simulations illustrate some gen"eral propositions: 
1. Simply cutting domestic spending - be it by govern-
ment spending cuts, higher taxes, or increased savings 
- is too draconian. It would result in a major contrac-
tion and record unemployment. But all successful poli-
cies require a degree of self-discipline of domestic 
spending. 
2. Slow adjustment requires considerable confidence by 
fore ign investors over a longish period. Further shocks 
could delay the return to the comfort zone, and confi-
dence may not necessarily hold. A slow adjustment is a 
high risk strategy. 
3. The increases required in the tradeable sector are sub-
stantial. Are they feasible? 
There are significant short-term supply-side constraints to 
many New Zealand tradeable producers. Farming, fishing, 
and forestry products face biological limitations. The pro-
duction capacity of many manufacturers and service ex-
porters is fixed or difficult to change quickly. Much of the 
import substitution component of manufacturing has al-
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ready been gutted by lower protection, while the little which 
remains faces a similar threat. 
Thus any short tenn export supply response relies on gen~ 
eral manufacturing and tourism. Whether they have !he 
production capacity to grow considerably faster is debat-
able. There may not be a lot of spare capacity for the sort of 
growth that is required. Moreover modem exporting re-
quires considerable market development. Even ignoring that 
most major Asian expon markets are in disarray, profit-
ability has been so unfavourable in recent years that there 
has been insufficient market development. 
In summary the prospects that the tradeable sector can 
quickly save the New Zealand economy from an eventual 
severe balance of payments crisis are not great. 
Conclusion 
While New Zealand continues with its current policies, it 
continues to face the prospect of low economic growth, 
based on commodity exports vulnerable to international 
trading conditions, with its best people migrating, and a 
socially and culturally impoverished nation. Few of New 
Zealander's ~cestors ·brown, white, and yellow. came 
with such a mean vision. 
There is a different approach: one which can be il1ustrated 
with industrial policy. It involves a vision of New Zealand 
as a full member of the international corrununity, active in 
all its transactions - peace, human rights, cultural, sport-
ing, intellectual and social as well as economic . with a 
firm commitment to New Zealand as an independent na-
tion, as autonomous as international responsibilities per-
mlt, flourishing in the interests of all the diversity and en-
ergy that makes up the ordinary New Zealanders. 
of the Seventh Conference, Institute of Geography, Vic-
toria University of Wellington, p.277-285. 
4. My views on "Think Big" will be. found in , In Stormy 
Seas. Suffice to say here that while Chapter ll expresses 
numerous reservations, it points out most of the critics 
are stronger on rhetoric than analysis. 
5. And back into the nineteenth century according to 
Brendan Thompson's census based industrial employ-
ment tables. Easton (1996) op cit. 
6. It is arguable that the two periods are even more dis-
tinct, because some of the new exports of the mid and 
late 1980's were the consequences of earlier decisions, 
such as the heavy subsidization of horticulture in the 
1970's and early 1980's. A similar effect on the import 
substituting side has already been mentioned. 
7. In Easton,B.H. (1997) Stormy Seas. 
8. See Easton, B.H. (1998) Microeconomic Reform: The 
New Zealand Experience, Microeconomic Rejonn and 
Productivity Growth: Workshop Proceedings, Produc· 
tivity Commission and ANU. 
9. For instance, given the way ACC is levied, some manu-
facturers have set up separate service companies. In-
formation technology has been another potent cause of 
outsourcing. 
10. In Easton, B. (1997). Stormy Seas 
l l . In the standard notation 
- C+i+G = 106 
-X = 30 
-M = 36 
- Y(GDP) = 100 
With the marginal propensities as follows: 
-tax = .4 
There is a national vision which desires a green and pleas- • impon :: .5 out of disposable income 
:: .5 out of disposable income. ant land. Butwithoutmanufacturing,adeindustrializedNew · consume & invest 
Zealand would be a severely depopulated ones, isolated 
from the vibrancy of international metropolitan life. Author 
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